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We perform event analysis on particular episodes of the tension in the Korean peninsula 
between 2000 and 2008, and investigate their effect on South Korean financial markets 
(stock markets, bond yield spreads and the exchange rate) given that South Korea would 
be the first affected by a military aggression from North Korea. Surprisingly, in nearly 
all cases, these events, which have often been dramatized in the world media, have no 
significant impact on either of these variables or only a very small one.  We also find no 
significant impact of events on listed firms that would a priori be likely to suffer from 
increased tension between the two Koreas. Since financial markets contain often better 
predictions than expert opinions or surveys, these results strongly suggest that the North 
Korean threat is non credible. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Attempts by the North Korean regime to build an arsenal of nuclear weapons in North 
Korea have been an important source of tension on the international scene in the last 
decade. The six party talk structure (the two Koreas, China, the US, Japan and Russia) 
which was put in place to deal with the North Korean threat has been facing important 
challenges and there is high uncertainty over how effective it can be in defusing the 
North Korean threat. South Korea is the first to be affected by the North Korean threat. 
The South Korean capital, Seoul, with a population of over 10 million people is close to 
the North Korean border. A nuclear strike from North Korea on Seoul would likely have 
catastrophic consequences. How likely would such an event be and how credible are the 
North Korean military threats?  
 
We use in this article event study methodology to study the impact of particular events 
related to the North Korean threat on financial markets in South Korea. Event analysis 
identifies the effects of particular events occurring on specific days or even at specific 
hours on variables such as financial market indices. In the context of tension on the 
Korean peninsula, some of the important events of recent years were likely to increase 
political and military tension. This is for example the case of the naval engagement 
between the two Koreas on 28 June 2002 or of North Korea’s conduct of a nuclear test 
on October 9 2006. Other events could be seen to reduce the tension such as the first 
summit between leaders of the two Koreas in June 2000. This Summit was a 
consequence of the initiation of the Sunshine policy by South Korean President Daejung 
Kim in 1998, aiming at peaceful reconciliation between both Koreas.  
 
The advantage of event studies is that they aggregate the views of financial markets on 
specific events: financial transactions revealing the opinions of a large number of 
independent traders who put money at stake in financial trades may reveal more 
information than expert opinions, newspaper articles or declarations by politicians or 
government officials.
1 Event study methodology provides a way of measuring how 
markets assess particular events. Event studies have been used increasingly to assess 
multiple events such as the effectiveness of US policy in Iraq (Chaney, 2008, 
Greenstone, 2007), the effect of CIA-supported right-wing coups in Chile and 
Guatemala on shares of companies expected to gain from those coups (Dube, Kaplan 
and Naidu, 2011), the effect of civil war in Africa on diamond-mining firms (Guidolin 
and La Ferrara, 2007) and others.  
 
Financial markets in South Korea are sufficiently developed that they can be compared 
with financial markets of advanced industrialized countries. It is thus not unreasonable 
to assume that financial markets in South Korea aggregate information at least as 
efficiently as markets from advanced industrialized countries. Event study methodology 
can thus be usefully applied on South Korean financial markets. 
 
                                                 
1 Prediction markets have been expanding in recent years precisely for this reason: they often give better 
predictions than expert surveys (on this see among others Wolfers and Zitzewitz, 2004; MacKinlay, 1997). 
  2We selected 20 important events related to the tension in the Korean peninsula and 
investigated their effect on 1) the Korean stock market KOSPI index, 2) the South 
Korean exchange rate and 3) bond yield spreads between South Korean and US treasury 
bills. Surprisingly, the main result is that in nearly all cases, these events, which have 
often been dramatized in the world media, have no significant impact on either of these 
variables or only a very small one.  The least sensitive variable to events is the bond 
yield spread. The only significant event to affect the bond yield was the announcement 
on April 10 2000 that leaders of both Koreas agreed to meet for the first time. The yield 
spread between Korean Treasury bonds and US bonds was reduced by 0.01 basis points 
on the following day. The most sensitive variable to events is the exchange rate and the 
stock market is somewhat in between. Note however that foreign exchange rate effects 
are mostly non-significant or very small. The event that had the largest effect on the 
foreign exchange rate was the nuclear test that took place on October 9 2006. The 
Korean Won lost 1.6 percent in that event window. We also find no significant impact 
of events on listed firms that would a priori be likely to suffer from increased tension 
between the two Koreas. 
 
The overall picture that emerges is that South Korean financial markets have not reacted 
either to signs of escalation of tension or to signs of easing of tension. This evidence 
suggests that South Korean financial markets do not perceive the North Korean threats 
as credible. Since South Koreans and the South Korean economy would be in direct line 
to suffer from some form of military or even nuclear aggression by the North Korean 
regime, our results strongly suggest that North Korean threats and aggressive verbal 
attacks on South Korea should be heavily discounted and not taken too seriously. This is 
consistent with the view that the North Korean regime has become economically 
extremely weak and uses military threats in order to extract aid. The threats themselves 
however do not appear to be credible for at least two reasons. First of all, the North 
Korean economy is already so weak that the regime could not sustain a military 
aggression without facing the prospect of collapse. Second, any deadly strike against 
South Korea would face immediate retaliation and also near immediate regime collapse. 
It is in the interest of the North Korean regime to appear threatening. However, if one 
does not believe these threats, one will strongly discount the aggressive discourse and 
behavior of the North Korean communist regime. The policy relevance of these results 
is thus quite obvious.  
 
In section 2, we briefly represent the event study methodology we will be using. In 
section 3, we describe the events we selected. In section 4, we present our main results 
and study the impact of high profile events in the tension between the two Koreas 
between 2000 and 2008 on financial markets as well as on individual firms. In section 5, 








  3 2. The empirical methodology 
 
Event study methodology is useful to look at high frequency effects of particular events 
on financial markets. Standard event study methodology can be represented by the 
following specification. 
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where yt is the variable relative to financial markets, X is a vector of control variables, 
and Deventi is an indicator that is equal to one if the event of interest occurs at time t.  
  
The above specification might be appropriate for the event whose effect starts and ends 
at time t.  However, the effect of the event may be prolonged for more than one period. 
In order to capture the full effect of the event, one needs a specification that allows for 
an effect on periods prior to and posterior to the event. Hence, we use the methodology 
of cumulative abnormal returns to analyze the effect of a particular event. Cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) are the summation of abnormal returns (AR) over the event 
window. As CAR1 =AR1 and CARt = CARt-1 +ARt for t  > 1, equation (1) can be 
rewritten as: 
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We will use the dummy variable method proposed by Salinger (1992) estimating the 
cumulative abnormal return inside the event window. In more detail, assuming that the 
event window is from two periods prior to the period when the event occurred to two 











t t T k kt t k D X y ε θ β α        ( 3 )  
 
where the dummy variable from to  takes on the value 1 for observation 
Tk+t, -1 for observation Tk+t+1 and 0 for other observations. The last dummy variable, 
takes on the value 1 for observation Tk+2 and 0 otherwise. This coding strategy 
implies that θk,-2 = CARk(1)=ARk(1),  θk,-1 = CARk(2), and so on. According to Salinger 
(1992), this method has the advantage that the standard errors are reported correctly.  
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If we look at the effect of a particular event on the South Korean KOSPI index, we have 
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  4Κοspirt  is a variable measuring the return on the KOSPI index at time t, in our case on 
day t. We want to abstract from the effects of aggregate news or worldwide variations in 
stock market return. We therefore use the return on the Dow Jones index Dowrt and 
Nikkei index Nikkeirt as control variables.
2 While events in the Korean peninsula may 
affect world financial markets, they are likely to affect South Korean financial markets 
more. On the other hand, aggregate world events are likely to affect all stock markets in 
a similar way. Measuring abnormal returns on South Korean financial markets thus 
requires filtering out aggregate movements on other markets. As South Korean stock 
market movements are most closely correlated with those on the New York and Tokyo 
stock exchanges, we use the return on these markets as a control variable.  
 
We perform similar regressions for the exchange rate of the Korean Won against the US 
Dollars, controlling for the exchange rate between the Yen and the Korean Won, and 
that between the Euro and the Won. We also added the leads and lags of the Dow Jones 
index together with the contemporary Dow Jones index, in order to capture spillovers 
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where EXUSKRt is the daily exchange rate between the Korean currency and the US 
Dollar expressed as the amount of Won per US Dollar; EXJPKRt and EXEUKRt refer to 
the daily exchange rate between the Korean Won and the Japanese Yen and that 
between the Korean Won and the Euro, respectively; DOWJt is the Dow Jones index. 
 
Similarly, we run the following equation for the yield spread between US Treasury bills 
with three years maturity and Korean government bonds with the same maturity, 
controlling for the yield spread betweencorporate bonds of US companies having AAA 
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where ΔYDSPTRESt  and ΔYDSPTRESt are the change in the yield spread of Treasury 
bills and corporate bonds, respectively.  
 
 
3. Identification of Events  
 
We identified North Korean-related events using both the diary of daily events relative 
to North Korea documented by the Ministry of Unification of the South Korean 
government as well as that documented by the Korean Institute for National Unification. 
The former is published online on a regular basis with some months delay while the 
                                                 
2 Using Nikkeirt may not be appropriate to test the significance of the North Korean-related events on 
South Korean financial markets if these affect Japanese financial markets to the same extent. Hence, we 
checked the robustness of our baseline results without Nikkeirt. 
  5latter is published at the end of each year. These documents contain detailed information 
on events concerning North Korea together with the dates of the events. We used the 
following criteria for main events. First, in order to be qualified as a main event, it 
should be included in both document sources and have received an important treatment 
in newspapers. Second, its effects should be perceived as large and having significant 
implications for South - North Korean relations. 
 
We used the dates of events as recorded in the documents but needed to adjust the dates 
in some cases because financial markets were closed on those dates. In such cases, we 
recorded as the “event” date the following day in which financial markets were open. 
We also checked whether these event dates coincided with other events that might affect 
financial markets but were independent of North Korean matters. However, we found 
no such overlapping events.      
 
In Table 1, we classified the above events into four categories: inter-Korean politics 
(political), military conflict (military), signs of economic openness (open), and external 
factors (external). According to our classification, six out of 20 events are classified as 
military. Also six events are categorized as external, five as part of inter-Korean politics 
and the remaining three as signs of economic openness. This diversity in the 
characteristics of the identified events makes is possible to test differential impacts of 
North Korean-related events.  
 
 
4. Estimation Results of the Effects of North Korea-related Events. 
 
We estimate equation (1) using the events identified in the previous section. In terms of 
the event window, we introduce CAR dummies before the event to take into account 
expectation effects on the market when they exist. We also take into account the 
possibility that the effects of the event may take place with some delay and introduce 
CAR dummies after the event. We found that an event window of 5 days (2 before, the 
same day and two after the event) is in general sufficient to capture possible pre- and 
post-event effects. 
  
We include all the CAR variables related to the above twenty events as regressors 
together with control variables. Control variables in the equation for stock markets 
include the return of the Dow Jones Index and that of the Nikkei Index. In the equation 
for exchange rates, we include exchange rates between the South Korean Won and the 
Euro as well as that between the Won and the Japanese Yen. In addition, we include the 
Dow Jones index with two leads and two lags to control for possible spillover effects of 
the US stock market on the dollar. As for the equation for bond markets, the change in 
the yield spread between Korean and US commercial bonds is included as a regressor 
together with the variables relative to the Dow Jones index.    
 
Table 2 summarizes the overall estimation results by putting together all the events. We 
only report whether or not there was a significant effect of the event as well as the level 
of significance. Empty cells mean insignificant results. The dependent variable in 
Column (1) refers to the daily stock market return which is defined as a percentage 
  6change in the KOSPI index. In Column (2), we use as dependent variable a percentage 
change in the daily exchange rate between the Korean currency and the US Dollar 
(expressed as the amount of Won per US Dollar). A positive (negative) sign of the 
coefficient on an event means that the Korean currency depreciates (appreciates) against 
the US dollar. The dependent variable in Column (3) is the change in the yield spread 
between South Korean and US Treasury bill (both at three year maturity). In Table 2, 
we report the sign of the event if any of the five event-related CAR variables is 
significant at the 10% significance level. In other words, we apply the lowest criterion 
possible to discern the significance of an event. A stricter test is a joint test for the 
significance of the five CAR dummies. The results of the joint test are presented in 
Table 2 with asterisk marks.
3   
 
As the table shows, most of the events did not have a significant effect either on the 
stock market, the exchange rate or the bond yield spread. Only nine out of sixty event 
variables (twenty times three dependent variables) turned out to be significant. At the 
5% significance level, the number of significant events drops to seven. Furthermore, the 
results of the joint test involving the five CAR dummy variables relative to an event 
suggest that only three events were significant. Among these, there is no single event 
that significantly affects all of the three financial markets. There are two events that 
affect two markets out of three significantly (though only one out of two is jointly 
significant): the announcement of the 1
st inter-Korean summit (Event 1) and the conduct 
of the North Korean nuclear test (Event 13). Event 1 affects both the stock and bond 
market, and Event 13 affects both the stock market and the exchange rate market. 
Among the other events found to influence significantly only one market, the only one 
for which the joint effect is significant is the first Summit between North and South 
Korean leaders (Event 2). To summarize, it would appear that among all important 
events selected, events related to the first Summit between the two leaders had a 
significant positive effect on the stock market while only the North Korean nuclear test 
had a significant effect on the exchange rate.
4  
 
The most important conclusion to be drawn from Table 2 is that financial markets in 
South Korea are not really affected by events related to the North Korean threat. In 
other words, markets consider the North Korean threat not to be credible. The positive 
effect on stock markets of the events related to the first North-South Korean Summit 
can be easily interpreted as expectations of more business opportunities with North 
Korea rather than as related to a reduction in the North Korean threat. Moreover, the 
fact that the conduct of the North Korean nuclear test had a significant effect only on the 
exchange rate could be explained by financial transactions involving foreign agents, 
possibly of a speculative nature. Moreover, the forex market is relatively shallow in 
                                                 
3 The + and – signs and the asterisk marks are thus related to different tests. 
4 If we count the number of CAR variables that were significant at the 10 % level, we find more for the 
foreign exchange while bond markets had the least. 
 
  7Korea compared to the other two markets, suggesting they might be swayed easily by 
some large players.
5 Otherwise, stock and bond markets would also be affected.  
 
We now present in somewhat more detail estimates for separate events.  Note that the 
estimates for separate events are very similar to those for pooled events. We therefore 
do not report results for all events but focus instead on five important events.  
 
Table 3 shows the estimates for the announcement of the first Summit between the two 
Koreas on April 10 2000. Even though the announcement was unexpected, some 
information must have leaked: the delegates of the two Koreas agreed to hold the 
summit at a confidential meeting in Beijing. Our data show that there are significant 
cumulative abnormal returns in the days before the announcement. On the day of the 
announcement there is a 6.5% cumulative abnormal return. This appears to be a rather 
large number. However, if we look at the raw numbers (see Event 2 in Figure A1 in the 
appendix), the effect does not seem large in comparison to the volatility of the KOSPI 
index. The KOSPI index increased by 3.9% he day of the announcement of the First 
Summit. The bond yield spread also goes down two days before the Summit by a tenth 
of a percentage point but does not move subsequently. 
 
In Table 4, we see the effects of the Naval Engagement in the West Sea on June 29 
2002. There is no significant effect. The same can be said for the testing by North Korea 
of an Anti-Ship Cruise missile on February 24 2003 shown in Table 5. The conduct of a 
nuclear test in North Korea on October 9 2006 had a negative effect on the stock market 
the same day and the next day and a negative effect on the Korean currency the same 
day, as can be seen from Table 6. Again, the magnitude of change on the stock market is 
not large in comparison to the volatility on these markets as can be seen from Events 5, 
7 and 13 in Figures A1 in the appendix. We however do see a visible spike in the 
exchange rate on that date (see Event 13 in Figure A2 in the appendix). More recently, 
the harsh attacks by the North Korean regime against South Korean President 
Myungbak Lee on April 1 2008 did not have an effect that day, as we see in Table 7. 
We do see an effect on the exchange rate two days before but it is not clear that this is 
related to this event. North Korea launched a missile test on Saturday March 28
th 2008 
(Event 19) during which the stock market was closed and thus t refers to Monday 30 
March 2008. Since North Korea singled the South Korean president out for criticism on 
Tuesday 1 April 2008 and this was an unexpected event, the missile test effects might 
have been mixed with the effect of the criticism on President Lee in t-2.   
 
We looked at the effects of the various events on the return of stocks of three selected 
individual companies that are heavily involved in business with North Korea. Namhae 
Chemical is the company that exports fertilizers to North Korea. Shinwon is a company 
producing clothes that built a factory in the Gaesung Industrial Complex in North Korea 
in October 2004 and began to produce clothes there in the early 2005. Kwang Myung 
Electric Engineering is the company that is responsible for the provision of electricity 
from South to North Korea.  
                                                 
5 Korean stock markets rank 14
th in the world in terms of its size. In contrast, the amount of daily 
transactions in Korean foreign exchange markets is about 15% of those of countries whose stock market 
has a similar size to Korean one.    
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As regards individual companies, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle company-
specific factors affecting the particular company from those related to North Korea if 
two factors take place in the same period. Some events are significant for Namhae 
Chemical. That is, Events 6, 17, and 18 affect stock returns of Namhae Chemical 
positively. Nevertheless, the effects of all other events are not precisely pronounced for 
Namhae Chemical. Furthermore, the stock prices of the other two companies are not 
affected by any of the events.  
 
Tables 8-10 again look at the same five selected events. The announcement of the 
North-Korean Summit had no significant effect on the companies doing business with 
North Korea with the exception of Namhae Chemical (the next day with significance at 
the 10 % level). In general however, the results are mostly non significant. In particular, 
the North Korean missile test had no effect on the companies we selected. Overall, we 
find that events related to the North Korean threat mostly had no significant effect on 
financial markets in South Korea as well as on individual firms.  
 
 
5. Robustness Checks  
 
In this section, we present some robustness checks. Instead of looking at the particular 
events we selected, we instead regressed financial market variables on the changes of 
the Korea Peace Index (KOPI), an index compiled by the Asia-Pacific Research Center 
at Hanyang University in South Korea to gauge the state of tension on the Korean 
peninsula. The method for compiling the KOPI is the same as that for the Conflict and 
Peace Database (COPDAP) developed by Edward Azar at the University of Maryland. 
Information is collected on daily events surrounding North Korea from published 
sources, mainly newspapers. Their significance is evaluated and the score of each event 
is aggregated according to a pre-determined scale. The index can range between –105 to 
92, representing respectively complete warfare and voluntary unification.  
   
We took the percentage change in the daily index of KOPI between June 2000 and June 
2008 as independent variable. We used the same controls as in Table 2 for the equation 
of stock market return, and added the Dow Jones index with two lags and two leads for 
the equations for the exchange rate and the change in the yield spread. In addition, we 
added two lags and two leads of KOPI to take into account the possibility of leakage of 
news and lagged effects. Table 11 shows the estimation results. There iss absolutely no 
significant effect. The results are even stronger than in the previous section. 
 
We further tested whether there are structural breaks in our series of stock returns, 
exchange rates, and yield spread. A concern was raised about possible instability of 
parameters of returns obtained by event studies in the presence of structural breaks 
(Burnett, 1995).
6 In the presence of structural breaks, the results from an event study 
analysis might thus overlook certain significant events. We apply two methods to detect 
                                                 
6 This can cause measurement errors in abnormal returns as the parameters of the return generating 
process changes over the sample period. 
  9possible structural breaks: the first is data-driven and the second is based on our prior 
knowledge about possible structural breaks.  
 
Our first method to detect possible structural breaks in our series is to let data identify 
such breaks and see if they can be related to particular events. We use an econometric 
technique developed by Bai and Perron (1998; 2003) which searches for mean breaks in 
the sample period. This method has the advantage that it does not require us to know the 
number of breaks before running regressions. If we decide the maximum number of 
possible breaks, it is designed to pinpoint significant changes in the mean level of a 
series. We ran a program to detect structural breaks for the KOSPI index return, the 
change in the exchange rate between the South Korean Won and the US Dollar, and the 
change in the yield spread between Korean and US three-year treasury bills. We did not 
find any structural breaks in any of the three series. In these tests, we allowed for 
heterogeneous and autocorrelated errors as suggested by Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
 
The second method uses our prior information about potential structural breaks. The 
previous South Korean government led by Daejung Kim developed the so-called 
“Sunshine Policy” of appeasement towards North Korea. Daejung Kim believed that a 
gentle and peaceful approach toward North Korea involving the provision of aid would 
be more effective in transforming North Korea as compared to the tough stance that had 
been the policy so far. The following president, Moohyun Roh, also adhered to this 
policy. However, the incumbent president, Myungbak Lee, who started his term in Feb. 
2008, publicly denounced the Sunshine Policy and changed the direction of policy by 
being tougher with North Korea. This suggests that there might be two separate periods 
in our sample: the first one is from the 1
st summit of the two Korean leaders in June 
2000 until the starting date of the incumbent president, Myungbak Lee, on 25
th Feb. 
2008, and the second period from 25
th Feb. 2008 onwards. We coded a “sunshine” 
dummy for the first period and a “new policy” dummy, respectively. As one can see 
from Table 12, none of the dummy variables are significant except for the exchange rate 
in the second period. This probably however reflects mainly the depreciation of the 
Korean currency due to the subprime mortgage crisis since Myungbak Lee came to 
power. We also tested the possibility of break in slopes by using an interaction term 
between policy dummies and US stock return, and found that such terms are not 
significant. We conclude that there are no structural breaks related to North Korean 
events or to changes in the South Korean government policy. 
 
We also regrouped the events according to their characteristics: military, political, 
related to openness or external factors according to the classification in Table 1. We 
further divided the events into partially expected and unexpected ones. We define as 
unexpected events those for which the Korean newspapers did not publish reports, 
information or rumors prior to their occurrence. We found that the following three 
events were unanticipated according to that definition: Bush’s axis of evil speech, the 
NLL naval engagement in West Sea, and the unofficial visit of Kim Jong-Il to China. 
Note that while the others were partially expected, they also entailed uncertainty as to 
what would really happen. For example, the first meeting between the leaders of both 
Koreas was expected but it was not known in advance how this meeting would go. A 
  10similar reasoning can be applied to other events. We then ran joint tests of the 
significance of the different classes of events. The results are shown in Table 13.  
 
Again, apart from political events, all other events are not significant and the political 
events only affect the stock market return. Neither the unexpected nor the partially 
expected events have any significant effect when pooled together. As stated above the 
significance of the political effects might not reflect a reduction of the North Korean 
threat but more simply the expectation of profits from more business with the North.  
 
Another possible cause of concern might be the presence of unit roots in the time series. 
The presence of unit roots may cause our regressions to be spurious. The figures in the 
appendix showing the three series present little suggestive evidence of unit roots in our 
series. In order to check the existence of unit roots more formally, we applied the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for the three dependent variables and found that all three 
variables are stationary.  
 
We also performed some diagnostic tests. These suggest that there are some problems in 
the residuals as can be seen from Table 14. Either the assumption of homoskedasticity 
or that of no temporal correlation is violated, or both of them. In addition, the residuals 
from the exchange rate regression may not pass the white-noise test. In order to correct 
for possible biases due to these violations, we used an instrumental variable approach 
combined with a technique for correction of autocorrelation. We employ the 
combination of the Newey-West method and General Method of Moments in which 
external instruments are specified, when they are available, and all other internal 
instruments with the optimal weighting matrix are used as well. As regards bond spread, 
we used Korean-US exchange rates and the Dow Jones index as external instruments for 
corporate bond spread between the US and South Korea. In a similar way, the exchange 
rate between the Euro and the Won and the return on the Dow Jones index are used as 
external instruments for the exchange rate between the Yen and the Won and the return 
on Nikkei index, respectively. 
 
As can be seen in Table 15, the results barely changed compared to Table 2.  In column 
(2), Event 19 (North Korea conducting a missile test) now has a jointly significant 
negative effect on the South Korean currency. Event 13 (the North Korean nuclear test), 
which was significant at the 5% level in Table 2, becomes now significant at the 1% 
level. However, there are no events that became newly significant after these corrections 
were made.  
 
One question one may ask is how events related to North Korea compare to other events 
in South Korea and their effects on financial markets. If other events affect financial 
markets, this may help put in clear perspective our results on the absence of effects of 
North Korean events on South Korean financial markets. We thus contrast events 
relative to North Korea with a South Korean-related event.  From 1997 to the early 
2000s substantial restructuring programs were carried out in order to overcome the 1997 
financial crisis caused mainly by heavy borrowing of Korean companies from abroad. 
We identified one event concerning Korean big businesses during this period. The 
KOSPI index dropped by 8.0% in 18
th September 2000 mainly because of a sharp 
  11decrease in the price of a semi-conductor chip, which was an important Korean export 
item. A report that the sale of a debt-stricken Korean conglomerate, the Daewoo Group, 
faced difficulties, also contributed to the fall in stock prices.  
 
We estimated the effects of this event on South Korean financial markets using the same 
method described above. The results are summarized in Table 16. South Korean 
financial markets were significantly affected. The impact of this event was felt strongly 
in the stock market which was negatively affected for all five days during the event 
window and for three days the impact was significant. Furthermore, the joint 
significance tests suggest that this event exerted influence on all of the three South 
Korean financial markets. These results are in contrast with North Korea-related events, 
which affected at most two of the three markets. The impacts of this event are more 
substantial than those of North Korean events in terms not only of the numbers of 
affected financial markets but also in terms of magnitude. Comparing the results of 
Table 16 (a drop in the price of semi-conductor chip and the difficulty in selling 
Daewoo) with Tables relative to North Korean events suggests that the magnitude of the 
former effects is multiple times larger than those of all North Korean events in all 
financial markets with only the one exception of the effect of the North Korean nuclear 
test on South Korean foreign exchange markets.  
 
 
6. Summary and Conclusions 
 
We performed event study analysis to see whether the increased tension on the Korean 
peninsula related in particular to the North Korean nuclear threat had affected South 
Korean financial markets. The striking result is that there are mainly no effects. The 
strongest effects we find are related to the announcement of the first meeting between 
leaders of North and South Korea that took place in June 2000 and one can argue that 
this reflects more expectations of business opportunities with North Korea rather than a 
reduction in the North Korean threat. Overall, the fact that the South Korean markets 
appear not to be afraid of events related to the North Korean threat provides strong 
suggestive evidence that this threat is not credible. International news media sometimes 
play up this threat but those who should be the most afraid of it, namely South Koreans, 
appear not to fear the North Korean threat. This is at least the conclusion from the 
opinions as shaped in the South Korean financial markets.  
 
This conclusion is not as intriguing as it may appear at first sight. The North Korean 
economy has become increasingly weak and dependent more and more on foreign 
assistance (Noland and Haggard, 2007; Kim et al., 2007). The regime would not likely 
be able to sustain any kind of military adventure. Moreover, the North Korean leaders 
are not suicidal and know that if they ever are in state of throwing a nuclear bomb on 
South Korea, this would mean assured self-destruction. The interest of the North Korean 
leaders is to appear threatening in order to extract financial aid from the international 
community. This allows them to buy time before the final collapse of the economy or of 
the regime itself.  
 
  12These results give quite clear policy conclusions. One should not fear the North Korean 
regime and its threat. Haste in the attempt to persuade North Korean authorities to stop 
the further launch of missiles or rockets can be interpreted by North Koreans as an 
increased possibility of extracting aid from South Korea and other countries. A calm but 
principled approach keeping the dialogue open could help the North Korean leaders 



















  13REFERENCES 
 
Bai, J. and Perron, P., 1998 “Estimating and Testing Linear Models with Multiple 
Structural Changes,” Econometrica, Vol. 66, No. 1 47–78. 
 
Bai, J. and Perron, P., 2003, “Computations and Analysis of Multiple Structural Change 
models,” Journal of Applied Econometrics, Vol. 18 , 1–22.  
 
Burnett, John, Carroll, C., and Thistle, P., “Implications of Multiple Structural Changes 
in Event Studies,” Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 35, No. 4, 467-
481.  
 
Chaney Eric, 2008, "Assessing Pacification Policy in Iraq: Evidence from Iraqi financial 
Markets" Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.  36, No. 1, 1-16. 
 
Dube, Arindrajit, Kaplan, Ethan, and Naidu, Suresh., 2011, “Coups, Corporations, and 
Classified Information,” Quarterly Journal of Economics  vol. 126 N0 3, pp. 1375-1409. 
 
Greenstone, Michael, 2007. "Is the "Surge" Working? Some New Facts,"  NBER 
Working Papers 13458.  
 
Guidolin, Massimo and Ferrara, Eliana La, 2007. "Diamonds Are Forever, Wars Are 
Not: Is Conflict Bad for Private Firms?," American Economic Review, vol. 97(5), 1978-
1993 
 
Kim, Byung-Yeon, Kim, Seok-Jin, and Keun Lee, 2007, “Assessing the Economic 
Performance of North Korea, 1954-1989: Estimates and Growth Accounting Analysis,” 
Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol.  35, No. 3, 564-582. 
 
MacKinlay, Craig., 1997, “Event Studies in Economics and Finance,” Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XXXV, 13-39. 
 
Noland, Marcus, and Haggard, Stephen, 2007, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid 
and Reform, Columbia University Press. 
 
Salinger, Michael., 1992, “Standard Errors in Event Studies,” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 27, No., 1,  39-53. 
 
Wolfers, Justin and Eric Zitzewitz, 2004. "Prediction Markets," Journal of Economic 








  14Table 1: Identification of Main Events and their Types 
 
Event Description  Date  Type 
1  Two Koreas agree to first meeting of their leaders  April 10 
2000 
Political
2  First South and North Korean Summit  June 14 2000  Political
3  Washington eases sanctions against North Korea         June 19 2000  External
4  Bush's axis of evil speech   Jan. 29 2002  External




6  North announces Kumgang-san as tourist region  Nov. 13 2002  Open 
7  North Korea's launching of an anti-ship cruise 
missile 
Feb. 24 2003  Military 
8  Agreement of inter-Korean economic cooperation   Aug. 20 2003  Open 
9  First round of the six-party talks in Beijing  Aug. 27 2003  External
10  Unofficial visit to China by Kim Jong-il   Jan. 10 2006  Open 
11  North Korea test-fires 7 missiles  July 5 2006  Military 
12  North Korea pledges to test nuclear bomb   Oct. 4 2006
2) Military 
13  North Korea conducts nuclear test  Oct. 9 2006  Military 
14  Initial actions for the implementation of the joint 
statement  
Feb. 13 2007  External
15    Two Koreas agree to second meeting of their 
leaders 
Aug. 82007  Political
16  North Korea agrees to declare and disable all 
nuclear facilities  
Sep. 3 2007
3) External
17  Second South and North Korean Summit  Oct. 2 2007  Political
18  New York Philharmonic Live from North Korea  Feb. 26 2008  External




4)  N. Korea singles President Lee out for criticism
4)  April 1 2008  Political
1)  Notes: NLL West Sea Naval Engagement occurred on Saturday 29
th June 2000 and the following 
Monday, 1
st July 2000 was a public holiday. This led us to record 2
nd July 2000 as the event day. 
2)  North Korea pledged to test nuclear weapon on 3
rd October 2006, which was a public holiday in 
South Korea, and thus the following day, 4
th October, was recorded as the event day. 
3)  North Korea agreed to declare and disable all her nuclear facilities on 1
st September 2007 but US 
financial markets were closed in this day, and thus we recorded 3
rd September 2007 as event day.       
4)  This event was included in neither of the diaries. Nevertheless, mass media and the public 
regarded this criticism as signal to the new South Korean government that future relations 
between the two Koreas would deteriorate. 
  15Table 2: Summary of Estimation Results of North Korean Event Studies 
 
Event no.  Stock market return 
(growth in % of the 
KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against 
USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
1 +***    - 
2  -***     
3      
4   -   
5      
6      
7      
8     - 
9      
10   -   
11      
12      
13 -  +**   
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
19   +   










Note: We report an event as significant if at least one of the days in the event window is significant at the 
10 % level. The asterisk next to the sign denotes that the five CAR variables relative to the event jointly 
significant. ***: significant at 1%  level. **: significant at 5%  level. *: significant at 10% level. Event 19 
and 20 occurred on 28
th March 2008 and 1
st April 2008, respectively. As a consequence, some days 
overlap in the estimations, causing drops of some CARs. The decision on which event is significant in 
determining exchange rates depends on which CAR dummies are dropped. In this table, we dropped two 




  16Table 3: Effects of Announcement of the first South and North Korean Summit (Event 
1) 
 
  Stock market return 
(KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
t-2  3.969 (2.70)***  -0.448 (1.02)   -0.109 (2.06)** 
t-1  3.927 (1.89)*  -0.575 (0.93)  -0.103 (1.38) 
t  6.516 (2.56)**  -0.285 (0.37)  -0.089 (0.97) 
t+1  4.995 (1.70)*  -0.311 (0.35)  -0.066 (0.62) 
t+2  1.908 (0.58)  -0.413 (0.42)  -0.066 (0.55) 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1%  level. **: significant at 5%  level. *: significant 




Table 4: Effects of West Sea Naval Engagement (Event 5) 
 
  Stock market return 
(KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and 
SouthKorea (treasury 
bill) 
t-2  -0.208 (0.14)  -0.070 (0.16)   -0.000 (0.00) 
t-1  1.913 (0.92)  0.674 (1.08)  -0.041 (0.55) 
t  2.521 (0.99)  0.265 (0.35)  0.020 (0.22) 
t+1  2.174 (0.74)  0.198 (0.23)  0.031 (0.29) 
t+2  5.311 (1.61)  0.259 (0.26)  0.046 (0.39) 
Note: The West Sea naval engagement occurred on Saturday 29 June 2002 on a day whenhe Korean stock 
market was closed. In addition, since 1
st July 2002 was a public holiday, the timing of the event, t, refers 
to 2




Table 5: Effects of Testing an Anti-ship Cruise Missile (Event 7) 
 
  Stock market return 
(KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
t-2  1.030 (0.70)  -0.146 (0.33)   0.007 (0.14) 
t-1  1.669 (0.80)  0.043 (0.07)  0.005 (0.07) 
t  3.457 (1.36)  -0.539 (0.71)  0.008 (0.09) 
t+1  1.104 (0.38)  -0.176 (0.20)  -0.012 (0.12) 
t+2  0.848 (0.26)  -0.630 (0.64)  -0.023 (0.19) 
Note: t-values are in parentheses.  
 
 
  17Table 6: Effects of Conducting a Nuclear Test (Event 13) 
 
  Stock market return 
(KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
t-2  -0.369 (0.25)  0.105 (0.24)   0.028 (0.53) 
t-1  -1. 412 (0.68)  0.288 (0.46)  0.057 (0.76) 
t  -5.374 (2.11)**  1.903 (2.50)**  0.045 (0.50) 
t+1  -4.912 (1.67)*  1.557 (1.77)*  -0.004 (0.04) 
t+2  -4.843 (1.47)  1.376 (1.40)  0.019 (0.16) 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
 
 
Table 7: Effects of North Korea Criticizing South Korean President (Event 20) 
 
  Stock market return 
(KOSPI index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
t-2  1.246 (0.49)  1.620 (2.12)**   0.030 (0.33) 
t-1  2.879 (0.98)  1.302 (1.48)  0.129 (1.22) 
t  1.795 (0.55)  0.598 (0.61)  0.065 (0.55) 
t+1  1.243 (0.34)  -0.314 (0.29)  -0.048 (0.37) 
t+2  1.383 (0.35)  -0.401 (0.34)  -0.079 (0.56) 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
 
 
Table 8: Stocks of Individual Companies: Effects of the Announcement of the First 
South- North Korean Summit (Event 1) and of the West Sea Naval Engagement (Event 
5) 
 
  Event 1  Event 5 




































































Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
  18Table 9: Stocks of Individual Companies: Effects of the North Korean Test of an Anti-
ship Cruise Missile (Event 7) and of North Korea Conducting a Nuclear Test (Event 13) 
 
  Event 7  Event 13 




































































Note: t-values are in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 10: Stocks of Individual Companies: Effects of North Korea Criticizing South 
Korean President (Event 20) 
 
 Event  20 


































Note: t-values are in parentheses. 
 
 
  19Table 11: Robustness Check using KOPI 
 





Change in yield 
spread between US 








Return on Dow Jones  
Nikkei 225    
Won-Yen exchange rates  
Won-Euro exchange rates 



























































Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 





Table 12: Tests of Structural Breaks due to Sunshine Policy and Policy under New 
Government 
 
 Stock  market 
return 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 


















Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
  20Table 13: Joint Tests for Significance of Groups of Events 
 





Change in yield 
spread between US 
and South Korea 
(treasury bill) 
Political  F(23, 2051) =  
2.06 
[0.0022]*** 
F(23, 2044) =   
0.50 [0.9760] 
F(22,  2045) =   
1.24 [0.1989] 
Military  F(24, 2051) =  
0.92 [0.5789] 
F(24, 2044) =   
1.26 [0.1763] 
F(25, 2045) =   
0.63 [0.9222] 
Open  F(15, 2051) =  
0.37 [0.9865] 
F(15, 2044) =   
0.98 [0.4779] 
F(15, 2045) =   
0.73 [0.7529]. 
Types 
External  F(30, 2051) =  
0.52 [0.9864] 
F(30, 2044) =   
0.45 [0.9954] 




F(77, 2051) =  
1.01 [0.4668] 
F(77, 2044) =   
0.71 [0.9716] 
F(77, 2045) =   
0.77 [0.9267] 
Expected 
Unexpected  F(15, 2051) =  
0.89 [0.5777] 
F(15, 2044) =   
1.18 [0.2840] 
F(15, 2045) =   
0.51 [0.9358] 
Note: p-values are in brackets. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
 
 
Table 14: Diagnostic Tests 
 
 Stock  market 
return 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield 
spread between US 






2 (1)=0.96 [0.327]  χ
2 (1)=5.65 
[0.018]** 















Note: p-values are in brackets. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
10% level.  
 
  21Table 15: Summary of Estimation Results of North Korean Event Studies with GMM 
and Newey-West methods combined. 
 
Event no.  Stock  market 
return 
Exchange rate (% 
change against USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and South 
Korea (treasury bill) 
1 +***    - 
2 -***       
3      
4   -   
5      
6      
7      
8     - 
9      
10   -   
11      
12      
13 -  +***   
14      
15      
16      
17      
18      
19   +**   










Note: We report an event as significant if at least one of the days in the event window is significant at the 
10 % level. The asterisk next to the sign denotes that the five CAR variables relative to the event jointly 





  22Table 16: Effects of South Korean events on South Korean Financial Markets: Decrease 
in Semi-conductor Chip Price and Difficulty in Selling Daewoo (September 18 2000) 
 
 Stock  market 
return (KOSPI 
index) 
Exchange rate (% 
change against 
USD) 
Change in yield spread 
between US and S. 
Korea (treasury bill) 
t-2  -3.138 (1.83)*  0.449 (1.00)   0.160 (3.03)*** 
t-1  -3.167 (1.31)  0.482 (0.76)  0.159 (2.14)** 
t  -11.05 (3.73)***  2.281 (2.95)***  0.310 (3.39)*** 
t+1  -12.16 (3.55)***  1.304 (1.46)  0.260 (2.46)*** 
t+2  -5.90 (1.54)  1.234 (1.23)  0.209 (1.77)* 
Joint significance 
test 
7.70 (0.000)***  4.41 (0.001)***  3.82 (0.002)*** 
Note: t-values are in parentheses. ***: significant at 1% level. **: significant at 5% level. *: significant at 
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  29Figure A3: The Bond Yield Spread and North Korean Events 
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